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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Because of the multiplicity of the parties and the roles
they played, and in the interest of clarity and brevity,
plaintiff and respondent, Mallory Engineering, Inc., will be
designated hereafter simply as "Mallory"; defendant, counterclaimant, cross-claimant, respondent and appellant, Ted R. Brown

& Associates, Inc., will be designated simply as "Brown"; and
defendant, cross-defendant, counterclaimant and appellant, Valad
Electric Heating Corporation, will be designated simply as
"Valad".
Abbreviations which will be used are:

Record - "R";

Transcript - "T"; line or lines - "lns"; Exhibit - "Ex." or
"Exs."; Purchase Order - "P.O."; kilowatt - "KW"; and drawing "Dwg".

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The action involves a contract by which Brown sold Mallory
some electrical heaters.

The heaters were to have met specific

performance criteria furnished by Mallory.

Brown purchased the

heaters from Valad, the manufacturer, and then resold them to
Mallory.

Valad, at Brown's instructions, shipped the heaters

directly to Mallory.

Valad also, as required, certified in

writing directly to Mallory, that the heaters would in fact meet
the required performance criteria.

The heaters, when delivered,

did not meet the required performance criteria nor were they
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

timely shipped.

The foregoing defaults gave rise to Mallory's

claims against both Brown, who sold Mallory the heaters, and
against Valad, the manufacturer, who certified the heaters'
performance to Mallory.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial commenced January 19, 1976, and continued through
January 29, 1976, for seven actual trial days.
to the Court sitting without a jury.

The trial was

By stipulation the case

was bifurcated and tried first as to the issue of liability and
next as to the issue of damages.
At the conclusion of the trial the Court took the matter
under advisement for the purpose of allowing all parties to
submit post-trial briefs.

Those briefs now are part of the

record in this case.
After having considered the evidence and testimony adduced
at the trial as well as the law applicable thereto, the arguments of counsel, the proposed findings, conclusions and
judgments, and all objections raised thereto, the Court on July
14, 1977, awarded judgments in favor of Mallory against both
Brown and Valad.

The Court also awarded judgment in favor of

Brown against Valad and dismissed the counterclaim and crosscomplaint of Valad.

The issues which were raised by the amended

counterclaim which the Court, during the course of the trial,
permitted Brown to assert against Mallory, were reserved for
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future trial.

(R. 678-9)

On July 22, 1977, the Court made and entered an order denying
the motion of Brown and Valad for a new trial.

(R. 680-1)

On November 16, 1977, the Court made and entered an amended
judgment which basically was the same as the foregoing judgments.
but which specifically limited the total liability of Valad to
the loss suffered by Mallory plus the loss suffered by Brown.
(R. 695-6)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mallory seeks affirmance of the judgments made by the
District Court in Mallory's favor against both Brown and Valad.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the statement of facts set forth in Valad's and
Brown's briefs portray a general scenario of the situation
giving rise to Mallory's claims, as was the situation in Watergate, both Brown and Valad have slanted the facts by pointing
the accusing finger of blame at the other in an effort to
exculpate itself from liability.

This is particularly true in

Brown's case wherein efforts were and are still being made to
characterize Brown as a mere "conduit" or "intermediary".
Mallory accordingly elects to make its own statement of facts.
Mallory is a specialty manufacturing firm which had
contracted with the United States Government to build some
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environmental test units.

(T. 4-10 and Exs. 1, 2 and 3)

The

units, as part of their essential components, required special
electrical heaters.

Mallory had previously purchased the

heaters from Chromalox Electric and Regan Engineering.

(R. 14)

Prior to the fiasco involving the Valad heaters which are
the subject matter of this case, Mallory had never purchased any
heaters from Brown.

Previously, however, Mallory had purchased

several thousands of dollars of other equipment and instrumentation devices from Brown.

Carl Nyman, Brown's employee, wanted

the opportunity to quote prices to Mallory for the heaters
Mallory needed for the environmental test units Mallory was
building for the United States Government.

(T. 97)

In this

regard Mallory was concerned about securing satisfactory heaters
for the very best price obtainable.

Brown, on the other hand,

was interested in making a profit by selling heaters to Mallory.
With reference to the heaters which are the subject matter of
this lawsuit the transcript shows (T. 10):

Q. (By Mr. Alston) Mr. Farber, I show you what, for

identification purposes, has been marked Exhibit
No. 4 and ask if you can tell us what that exhibit
is?

(Emphasis supplied)
This criteria is based upon the specification
requirements we had to meet in order to fulfill
our contract with the Government . . . .
Thereafter, Brown furnished quotes which, among other things,
-5-
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set forth prices and delivery dates for heaters of the specified
criteria which Brown wanted to sell Mallory.
as well as Exs. 4, 9, 12 and 14)

(T. 10-11 and 220

After receiving the quotes from

Brown, and under date of 12/14/1972, Mallory submitted its

P.O. 4016 to Brown for some 15 KW and 21 KW heaters.
Ex. 9)

(T. 18,

The very next day Brown, on its letterhead stationery,

submitted its own P.O. 6730 to Valad.
was for only the 21 KW heater.

Brown's P.O. however

(T. 20, Ex, 10)

Subsequently

Brown on 12/20/1972 sent Valad a memorandum in which reference
was made to Brown's P.O. 6730.(Ex. 10)

This added some 15 KW

heaters to Brown's P.O. for the 21 KW heaters.

(T. 22-23 and

Ex. 11)
Under date of 12/26/72 Mallory submitted its P.O. 4047 to
Brown for some 50 KW and 12 KW heaters.

(T. 23-24, Ex. 12) As

it previously did with Mallory's P.O. to Brown for the 15 KW and
the 21 KW heaters, Brown, on its letterhead stationery, thereupon submitted its own P.O. 6754 to Valad for those heaters. (T. 25,

Ex. 13)
As to the two 36 KW heaters which are also the subject matter
of this case, Mallory on 2/8/1973 submitted Brown its P.O. 4241,
designated by Lee Farber of Mallory as a "confirming purchase
order". (T. 27, Ex. 14)

The preceding day, 2/7/1973, Brown, as

it had done before in connection with its P.O.s to Valad for the
other heaters, on its letterhead stationery, submitted its own

P.O. 7269 to Valad for those heaters.

-6-
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The oral testimony and documentary evidence in the record
is undisputed that the heaters were defective in several
particulars.

They were not timely delivered.

They were deficient

in capacity and exceeded the sheath temperatures expressly set
forth in the specified performance criteria.
Although Valad was given every opportunity to correct the
defective heaters it manufactured and shipped direct to Mallory
at Brown's request, thereby minimizing the damages it had
already caused and was continuing to cause Mallory, it failed
and refused to do so.

Other than urge Valad to do something

to minimize the damages which were accruing as a direct and
proximate result of the defectively manufactured heaters, Brown
did nothing.

Brown simply defaulted on its contract with

Mallory to sell and deliver or have delivered to Mallory heaters
meeting specific performance criteria.
The above are the basic facts giving rise to Mallory's
claims against both Brown and Valad.

Where deemed necessary,

additional facts will be set forth in this brief to support
the points argued by Mallory.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE UTAH COURT DOES HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT VALAD
In this case there should be no question but that Valad in
fact subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court.

-7-
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In enacting the Utah long-arm statute the Legislature made
the express policy determination explicitly set forth in Sec.
78-27-22 UCA 1953 that:
" . . . the public interest demands the state provide
its citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons who through certain
minimal contacts with this state incur obligations
to citizens entitled to the state's protection . . II
The Legislature in Sec. 78-27-24 then enumerated those acts which
would subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of the Utah
Court.

In part that section provides:

"Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102, whether
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this
state;
(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty; . . . "
An enlightened interpretation of the foregoing Utah longarm statute was made by this Court in the recent case of Abbott
GM Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 578 P2d 850.

In

the Abbott case, a unanimous Court speaking through Justice
Wilkins said:
"While it is true that this Court has stated that "if
there is any difference between what is stated as the
'doing business' and the 'minimal contact' tests it
is probably more in semantics than in substance," we
now conclude that from an examination of many individual
cases concerning jurisdictional matters, including the
present one there can well be a significant and controlling
difference in those two concepts."

-8-
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In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action in the
Abbott case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, and in remanding the case to resolve the
conflicts of facts set forth in the affidavits filed by the
respective parties upon which affidavits the case was decided,
this Court said:
"The District Court, after remand, should as heretofore
directed, conduct a hearing to resolve the conflicts
of facts stated in the affidavits filed by the parties.
And that hearing should be governed by inquiries into
and a measurement of (a) the nature and quality of
Piper's acts (b) whether Piper engaged in purposeful
- rather than unintentional - acts in order to avail
itself of the privileges and protections here (and the
substance - not just form - of Piper's business relationship and acts should be ascertained), and (c) any
other relevant matters bearing on 'notions of fair play
and substantial justice'."
The facts determinative of the Utah Court's jurisdiction
over Valad in this case are clear cut and undisputed.

Valad

did the specific acts which the Legislature said would subject
a nonresident to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court.

Valad

contracted with Brown to supply goods (electrical heaters) which
Brown sold Mallory.

Valad also expressly warranted in writing

by its Certificates of Certification that the heaters would meet
certain performance criteria which the heaters did not.

As a

direct and proximate result of the failure of the heaters to meet
the required performance criteria, substantial injury and damage
was caused Mallory.
The selling and supplying of the heaters by Valad to Brown
for resale by Brown to Mallory was a purposeful and not an

-9-
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unintentional act.

It was done only after many deliberate

negotiations had taken place between Brown and Valad.

Further-

more, the warranty Valad made by virtue of its Certificates of
Certification was purposeful and not unintentional.

The warranty

was made by Valad so as to be in compliance with the express
condition of the contract Valad had with Brown.

Considering

the foregoing purposeful deliberate acts on the part of Valad,
"notions of fair play and substantial justice" dictate that the
Utah Court does and did have jurisdiction over Valad.
An examination of the record clearly evidences that by
the pleadings Valad submitted, as well as the appearances Valad
made (where its entire case was thoroughly aired), Valad
subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court.

So as

not to belabor this point, Mallory agrees with and by reference
hereby adopts the argument so ably set forth in the brief of
Brown in this regard.
A not insignificant fact too is that even before Valad
submitted any pleadings, Godfrey P. Schmidt, the attorney for
Valad, by telegram, requested a two-week extension of time which
was granted.

The cross telegrams appear in the record at pages

126- 7.

Considering the totality of all of the foregoing, Valad's
contention that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Utah Court is without merit.
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Point II

BROWN WAS NOT MERELY A "CONDUIT" OR "INTERMEDIARY" BUT
IN FACT CONTRACTED TO SELL MALLORY HEATERS WHICH WOULD
MEET SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CRITERIA. HOWEVER, BROWN DEFAULTED ON THAT CONTRACT CAUSING MALLORY LOSS & DAMAGE
Brown endeavors to avoid any responsibility or liability
by asserting that it was solely a "conduit" or "intermediary"
in the entire transaction who merely transmitted Mallory's
heater criteria to Valad, the manufacturer of the heaters.

At

page 18 of Brown's brief the statement is made that " . . . all
concerned knew that, in fact, Brown was not purchasing the
heaters and reselling them, but was simply serving as an
intermediary . . . ". This assertion is simply not true.
A careful and objective analysis of the record won't support
Brown's contention in this regard.

On the contrary, the record

demonstrates rather conclusively that Brown was more than a mere
"conduit" or "intermediary", and, in fact, that Brown was the
actual seller of the heaters to Mallory.
Prior to the fiasco involving the Valad heaters, Mallory
had never purchased any heaters from Brown but had purchased
several thousands of dollars of other equipment and instrtm1entation from Brown. (T. 14 and 97)

Brown no doubt made a profit on

those sales and would no doubt make a profit on a sale to
Mallory of the heaters which Mallory needed for the environmental
units Mallory was making for the Government.
Carl Nyman, who was Brown's chief negotiator between Brown
and Mallory as well as between Brown and Valad, admitted that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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he never represented he was an "agent", "representative",
"intermediary" or "conduit" for Mallory.

On cross-examination

by Valad's attorney he said (T. 351):

Q. Did you ever represent to Valad in so many words that
you were an agent or representative of Brown - of
Mallory?
A. I don't recall ever having used such a representation
or discussion.
Q. Or did you ever represent to Valad that you were an
intermediary for Mallory or a conduit for Mallory?
A. I don't recall having used that terminology.
Mr. Nyman wanted an opportunity to quote prices on the
heaters for the environmental units Mallory had heretofore
purchased from Chromalox Electric or Regan Engineering. (T. 14)
With reference to the initial contact between Brown and Mallory,
Lee Farber, President and General Manager, stated on cross-examination by Brown's attorney (T. 96):

Q. Mr. Farber, who in Mallory's organization contacted
Ted R. Brown with regard to the Government job that
is the question here?
A. Who contacted Brown?
Q. Yes.
A. I am not certain that Mallory did contact Brown. I
think Brown contacted Mallory.
To enable Brown to furnish quotes on heater prices, Mallory
furnished specific heater performance criteria to Brown. (T. 10
and Ex. 4)

The testimony of Mr. Farber in this regard is (T. 10):

Q. (By Mr. Alston) Mr. Farber, I show you what •. f~r

identification purposes, has been marked Exhibit
No. 4 and ask if you can tell us what the exhibit is?
MR. FARBER: Exhibit No. 4 is entitled Electrical Heater
Criteria. And this was criteria that I re ared and
submitted to Mr. Car Nyman o t e Te R. Brown Company
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se

him understand what we
us eaters on Jo .

After receiving the heater criteria Brown secured price
quotes from Valad on the Valad heaters, which heaters were of an
entirely different type than the heaters Mallory previously
used and had purchased from Chromalox Electric or Regan
Engineering.

Upon receipt of the price quotes from Brown on

the Valad type heater, Mallory submitted to Brown its P.O.s
4016. 4047 and 4241 for some 15KW,, 21 KW, 50 KW, 12 KW and 36
KW heaters.

(Exs. 9, 12 and 14)

Rather than just send copies

of Mallory's P.O.s to Valad with a transmittal letter, Brown sent
Valad its P.O.s on Brown's own letterhead stationery.

These

were Brown's P.O.s 6730 (Ex. 10), 6754 (Ex. 13), and 7269
(Ex. 15).
A comparison of the Mallory and Brown P.O.s for the very
same heaters shows that the Brown P.O.s are not mere copies of
the Mallory P.O.s but that there are some significant differences
between them.

This is evidenced by the uncontradicted testimony

of Mr. Farber elicited by Brown's attorney as follows (T. 97-8):

Q. You did not, at any time, consider that Ted R. Brown

& Associates were fabricating manufacturing or in any
way designing those heaters?
A. Prior to seeing all of the Court documents and exhibits,
it was my understanding that Mr. Nyman was not going
to engineer or design anything on the heaters. But I
am not so sure now after I have seen the purchase
orders that he issued to Valad.
Q. The relationshi that ou initiated with Brown was
not one ase upon t eir per arming any esign service
for you on those heaters? (Emphasis supplied)
-13-
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A. As far as I was concerned the relationship that existed
with Brown is that Brown wanted to sell us heaters and
that we wanted to buy them. (Emphasis supplied)

On each of the Brown P.O.s, right after the name Valad
Electric Heating Co., to whom each of the Brown P.O.s was
directed, appears the following:
"PLEASE ENTER OUR ORDER FOR THE FOLLOWING" (Emphasis
supplied).

There is not indication of any kind whatsoever on any

of Brown's P.O.s that Brown was submitting a purchase order
as "agent", "Intermediary" or in any other capacity for and
on behalf of what Brown now endeavors to assert was Brown's
so-called "principal", namely:
and unequivocal.
P.O.s.

Mallory.

The language is clear

The P.0.s state that they are our (Brown's)

The instructions simply say "ship to" Mallory Engineering.

Valad's consistently repeated statements throughout the
record that Brown was its customer (purchaser or vendee), which
incidentally are uncontroverted, is further evidence that as
between Brown and Mallory, with reference to the heaters which
are the subject matter of this case, Brown was the seller or
vendor and Mallory was the purchaser or vendee not of Valad
but of Brown.

This seller-purchaser arrangement as between Brown

and Mallory is further substantiated by the plain, unambiguous
language on all of Brown's P.O.s.

All of them say:

"Ordered

by Carl Nyman", and they, in turn, are all signed by Brown's
Purchasing Agent.

None of Brown's P.0.s say:

"Ordered for

Mallory by Brown", the "agent" or "intermediary" for Mallory,
the principal of Brown.

Furthermore, all of Brown's P.O.s say:
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"BILL TO:

Ted R. Brown & Assoc., P.O. Box 1356, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84110".

They do not say bill our principal,

Mallory, for whom Brown is acting as "agent", "representative"
or "intermediary" /.us, Brown.
While not binding on this Court, during the course of the
trial, the District Court made several observations as to what
in fact the testimony and doctnnentary evidence indicated the
relationship between Brown and Mallory was.

At one point in

the trial the Court said (T. 294):
Well, I know what the relationship between the plaintiff
and Brown is. That's evident from the exhibits, and that's
vendor-vendee, at least in the initial stages. There was
testimony that they contacted Brown - I believe Brown
contacted Mallory in the initial stages and they entered
into some ne otiations to urchase heaters to certain
criteria.
Emp asis supp ie
Furthermore, in responding to Brown's contention that Carl Nyman,
for and on behalf of Brown, was acting solely as an "intermediary",
the Court said:
Well, he did something more than just forward Mallory's
purchase order.
Later, the Court said (T. 644):
Now, wait a minute. He went further than that. It
wasn't a question of him (Nyman) just saying to Mallory
"Look. You can get this work done at Valad Electric
in New York," and walking away from it. They participated actively all the way through the negotiations.
The response which Valad's attorney made during the trial
to the "conduit" or "intermediary" theory argued by Brown's
attorney is enlightening as well as persuasive.

It's found at

page 305 of the transcript and is as follows:

-15-
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MR. SCHMIDT:
I'd like to go back to their (Brown's) cross-complaint.
The cross-complaint uses two words to signify the status
of Brown. One is intermediary. And the other is conduit,
c-o-n-d-u-i-t.
I think the word intermediary is not very illuminating
because there are very many kinds of intermediary. And
there is another word in the picture that has been used
today. And that is - and it's been used before in this
case. And that is it was for transmittal only that Brown
acted. In other words it seemed to me, if I understood
that argument correctly, that Brown was a kind of letter
carrier for Mallory.
Well, I asked myself, can a letter carrier sue an addressee?
Can an intermediary or a conduit, if that's what happened . .
Contrary to the statements and inferences in Brown's brief,
there is nothing inconsistent in a vendor-vendee relationship
which would preclude the vendee in that relationship from demanding
a "certification" from the "manufacturer" as to the performance
of the item or items being purchased.

Nor is there anything in

such a relationship which would preclude the vendee from making
direct contact with the "manufacturer" if there was
or defect with respect to any item or items.

any trouble

Such demands and

contacts are entirely consistent and in harmony with a vendorvendee relationship.

Furthermore, the evidence in this case

is uncontradicted that when trouble arose with the Valad heaters,
Carl Nyman of Brown specifically requested that Lee Farber of
Mallory contact Valad directly and firsthand to explain the
problem. (T. 75)
There is evidence and testimony in the record about some
preliminary negotiations between Valad and Brown pointing toward
the possibility of Brown possibly becoming Valad's "agent" or

-16-
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"sales representative" in Utah.

This never materialized.

More than likely the reason the "agent" or "sales representative" relationship never materialized between Valad and Brown
was because of the modest 5% to 10% maximum corrnnission Brown
would have derived under such an arrangement.

However, by

Brown purchasing the heaters from Valad as it did, and
reselling the heaters to Mallory as it did, Brown's margin of
profit on the transaction ranged from 19% to 37%.
It a party does, in fact, become an "agent" or "intermediary"
in a particular transaction, there is usually discussion and
agreement as to what the "cormnission" or "consideration" is
going to be.

There is absolutely no testimony or evidence

that there was any such discussion or agreement between Brown
and Mallory.

This fact is another in the totality of facts

evidencing that the arrangement between Brown and Mallory in
the transaction which gave rise to the lawsuit which is the
subject matter of this appeal was that of seller and purchaser
or vendor and vendee, and not one of "agency" or "intermediary"
or some similar relationship.
The testimony and evidence adduced simply does not support
Brown's contention that it served solely as an "intermediary''
who merely transmitted Mallory's P.0.s to Valad.
Point III

THE HEATERS DID NOT MEET REQUIRED PERFORMANCE
CRITERIA AND THEY WERE NOT .TIMELY DELIVERED
There is no question but that the heaters did not meet
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Mallory's required performance criteria.

Lee Farber, Mallory's

president and general manager, testified in this regard
(T.

39-40) :

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Did you have any problems with the heaters at all?
Yes. The heaters were deficient in capacity. They
did not produce the capacity that we specified. And
the sheath temperature exceeded the allowable
temperature limits.
How do you know that they didn't meet the requirements,
Mr. Farber?
After we installed the heaters in the environmental
chambers, we operated them. We conducted shop tests.
We measured the voltage and amperage as an
indication of the capacity. And we installed temperature sensors, thermal couples on the heaters, the
heater sheaths, the heater fins and also in the air
stream of the chamber to measure sheath temperature,
fin temperature and chamber air temperature.

The test results for the 21 KW and the 15 KW heaters are
set forth in Exs. 24 and 25.

By comparing the test results with

the heater criteria furnished, and as explained by Mr. Farber
in his testimony, it is evident that the heaters were defective.
Ex. 24 shows that the actual heater capacity of the 21 KW
heater was only slightly more than 16 kilowatts rather than
the specified 21 kilowatts.

Ex. 25 shows that the actual heater

capacity of the 15 KW heater was only between 9 and 10 kilowatts
rather than the specified 15 kilowatts.
Brown's employee, Carl Nyman, not only examined the
tests conducted by Mallory but he also conducted his own tests.
He thereby confirmed that the heaters were in fact deficient.
He advised Peter Cecchini of Valad of this.

His testimony in

part is (T. 333-4):

-18-
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Q.

A.

Did you advise him (Peter Cecchini) that he had
failed - that Valad had failed to furnish the
heaters that were required by your (Brown's)
order?
We did. And advised him specifically that they
(the heaters) were tested to produce too low a
kilowatt delivery and that the sheath temperatures
exceeded the specified figure.

Strabo Laboratories, Inc., an independent testing lab in
Salt Lake City, at the special request of Valad and in the
presence of representatives from Valad and Mallory, made other
tests.

(Ex. 38)

The tests at the Strabo lab gave about the

same performance results as the tests made by Mallory and Brown.
Even though Valad, at page 26 of its brief, argues about the
so-called "unrefuted and irrefutable evidence of the
unreliability of Mallory's tests", Valad admits that the Strabo
lab tests "exhibit results similar to the Mallory tests".

The

independent Strabo lab tests confirmed absolutely that the
heaters were deficient in capacity.
Valad made its own tests.

However, the tests Valad made

apparently were only made to certify as to the accuracy of
the thermostats and not to certify as to the performance of the
heaters.

The testimony of Geoffrey Mccarron, production

manager of Valad, with reference to the tests made by Valad
is as follows (T. 556):

Q.

A.
Q.

O.K. Now, in response to the question that was just
asked you by your counsel, you said that you did make
tests on the 21 KW heater and that it was done in
your presence at your plant at the Valad plant?
Yes, sir.
What did the test consist of?
-19-
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A.

Q.
A.

The same test as we made on the 1500, which was
to certify as to the accuracy of the thermostats
that they would maintain the 250 degree maximum
sheath temperature.
And that's all?
That is specifically why the test was made, yes.

It is very evident by the testimony from all of Valad's
witnesses as well as by the arguments in Valad's brief that
Valad was using limit thermostats in the heaters as the means
for controlling temperatures rather than as "fail safe" devices.
If the limit stats were used to control sheath temperatures,
and the testimony of Valad's witnesses and the arguments of
Valad's counsel evidences that this was the case, then
irrefutably and by its own admissions Valad's heaters did not
meet the requirements specified by Mallory.
There were no limit stats or controllers called for by
any purchase orders issued by Mallory to Brown.
Exs. 9, 12 and 14)

(T. 54 and

However, if Valad had not installed any

thermostats, Mallory would have done so as "fail safe" devices
only in case everything else in the heater system failed.
(T. 52 and 107)

Mallory's purchase orders to Brown for the

15 KW and the 21 KW heaters required that " . . . sheath temperature will not exceed +250°F when operating at continuous full
voltage. .

" Very simply the requirement was that there be

continuous full voltage.

If the limit stats interrupted the

flow of current the heaters failed the performance test (T. 186)
because you could no longer get full capacity out of the heaters
(T. 185).
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With reference to the use of limit stats to control
heater temperatures, Mr. Farber of Mallory on cross-examination
by Brown's attorney, testified as follows (T. 212):

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

And it is never intended by the manufacturer, by the
user or anyone else that the limit stat that keeps
the house from being burned down by some other
disaster that goes wrong with the rest of the controls
should be used as a control to regulate the heat of
that furnace, is it?
I can't speak for the manufacturer, but I can speak
for Mallory Engineering and say absolutely not.
All right. That's my point. So that any design in
these heaters which you have referred to that
intended to utilize the thermostat which is shown on
drawing number 119, and I show you Exhibit No. 17,
and the thermostat which you referred to as being
one of the typical thermostats or the limit stats
I think is the word you have used?
Yes.
That intended to use the limit stat as a means of
controlling the operation of the burner so that it
didn't get too - or that it produced the heat, would
be incorrect in its design?
Absolutely.

In referring to Ex. 9 which was Mallory's P,O. to Brown
for the 15 KW and the 21 KW heaters, Mr. Nyman of Brown said
(T. 233):

Q.

A.
Q.

Let me direct your attention now to a portion of that
exhibit which reads down here "fabricator shall
submit written certification that sheath temperature
will not exceed 250 degrees Farenheit when operating
at continuous full voltage with a 5 FPC air velocity
and a maximum air temperature of plus 260 degrees
Fahrenheit." Did I correctly read that?
With two exceptions. It is 5 FPS. And at a maximum
air temperature of 160 Fahrenheit.
Can you tell us what that phrase means, at continuous
full voltage, in your opinion as an electrical engineer?
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A.

Q.

A.

My interpretation is that the particular heater
should, when operating at its designed voltage and
at its designed power production, with the air
velocity moving across it as specified, should have
a sheath temperature not exceeding the specified
250 degrees.
Now, we have heard a lot of testimony, Mr. Nyman,
about thermostats. If a thermostat were put on to
interrupt the flow, would that comply with the
requirements of that specification in your opinion?
In my opinion it would not.

The testimony of Mr. Donald C. Thomas, a completely
independent professional electrical engineer with considerable
experience in designing heaters, with reference to the use of
thermostats to control sheath temperatures, is most revealing.
Mr. Thomas first spoke about the tests which were conducted by
Valad which were conducted solely for the purpose of certifying
as to the accuracy of the thermostats.

Mr. Thomas said

(T. 598-600):

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.

Mr. Thomas, I think you heard testimony concerning
certain tests conducted by Valad in New York on
certain of these heaters?
Yes, sir.
And my recollection of their testimony is the tests
were made primarily to determine whether or not the
thermostats worked?
Yes, sir.
Do you recall the testimony concerning what they said
the temperatures showed and what the maximum temperature
showed - or let me put a question first.
Here these tests (Valad's) conducted with the - with
a flow of air or with still air, according to the
testimony as you remember it?
The testimony as I remember it was a lab test, bench
test, where there was no flow of air but the atmospheric
conditions in a room.
Do you recall what was said concerning the amount of
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A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

temperatures that were arrived at, both as to when
the thermostats went on and the maximum temperatures
that were reached?
I think I remember that the maximum - I am not sure.
They referred to a chart. Maybe if I looked at the
chart.
The maximum reached was approximately 250, and cut
down to 225 after. It might have been 225, 220.
I'd have to see the chart.
This chart indicates apparently on the initial swing,
as I would interpret it, that the temperature went
above 250, swung down to 200 and after that, almost
in the sine wave, went from 250 to 200 degrees.
Do you recall any other testimony concerning the
temperature reaching close to 500 degrees on a
certain test that was conducted?
Yes, sir. I remember that 598 degrees, apparently
was reached when this thermostat was not connected.
What would that indicate to you, Mr. Thomas?
That 598, if I interpreted what I heard right, was
the sheath temperature in which specifications say
that should not exceed 250 degrees. In other words,
I would assume that this thermostat is bein5 used to
control the heater down to swin between 25 and 200
egrees.
Emp asis supp ie
Is this a proper use of a thermostat, Mr. Thomas?
It could be a proper use. In this case, with the
s ecifications as I read them, it calls for 15 KW
at continuous u
vo tage.
Emp asis supp ie
So, when you are reading it in connection with these
specifications, in this purchase order (Mallory's)
which says continuous full voltage, would that be in
compliance with this purchase order?
No sir. I would say that in that my interpretation
of these specifications are that I am to have the
use of the 15 KW of heaters all the time, and they
will maintain a sheath temperature of 250 degrees.
I don't see here where the 15 KW should be cut off to
comply with the 250 degrees.

Specifically referring to the electrical heater criteria
set forth in Ex. 4 (Mallory's "electrical heater criteria") and
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the requirements of Mallory's P.O. (Ex. 9) for the 15 KW and
the 21 KW heaters, Mr. Thomas testified further as follows
(T. 602):

Q.
A.

Is a thermostat a proper method of controlling sheath
temperature, or is that really a design function?
According to these specifications, it must be a
design function. Without any outside control, the
sheath temperature should not go above 250 degrees.

Later Mr. Thomas said (T. 609):

Q.

A.

Mr. Thomas, you have seen these heaters. You have
seen the Strabo tests. You have seen the tests that
were taken at the Mallory lab which were examined by
Mr. Nyman, and I think Mr. Brown saw some of those
tests, and the representative of Valad examined some
of the tests.
Did these heaters meet the requirements of the
purchase orders which Mallory sent to Ted R. Brown
& Company?
No sir.

The Valad heaters simply did not meet Mallory's required
performance criteria.

That is no doubt why Brown says in its

brief at page 16:
.Brown does not dispute the contention of Mallory
that the heaters supplied by Valad were defective and
were not manufactured in accordance with the mandate of
the purchase order of Mallory. . . "
Not only were the heaters defective, they were not timely
delivered, and, time was of the essence,

After Carl Nyman of

Brown secured heater criteria from Mallory, he then on behalf
of Brown gave Mallory some price quotes and delivery dates for
the 15 and the 21 KW heaters Brown wanted to sell Mallory.
The quoted delivery dates submitted by Brown to Mallory in
writing were 8 to 10 weeks,

(Ex, 4, T, 10 a~d 193)

Mallory,
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however, couldn't live with the quoted delivery dates,

As

testified to by Mr. Farber of Mallory (T. 685, lines 13-30 and
T. 686, lines 1-6):
A. . . . I personally discussed with Mr. Nyman that I
could not give Ted R. Brown a purchase order for
the heaters based upon an eight to ten week delivery
schedule, and that one of the purchases - conditions
of the purchase order would be six weeks.
Q. Was that put in the purchase order?
A. That was put in the purchase order.
Q. That's the purchase order 4016 that's one of the
exhibits in this record at this trial?
A. Yes, sir. That was not only put in the purchase order
as a promised date, that was put in the purchase order
as a guaranteed date, because the significance of that
is that these pieces of equipment were very large that
we were working with. They occupied most of our shop
space. And for us to effectively schedule our work,
we had to bring this work along in the shop so that our
part of the job would be completed, ready to receive the
heaters, when they were installed.
In addition to the delivery date of the heaters, it was
also specified that within two weeks, we would have
shop drawings, because Mallory could only fabricate
the chamber up to what we call a head wall. And then
we could not fabricate the heat wall until we knew
the structural configuration of the heaters so that
we could make our heater arrangement in the head wall.
Accordingly, when Mallory did

sub~it

its P.O. to Brown

for the heaters, Mallory expressly set forth therein that (Ex. 9):
II

"

.Shop drawings required within 2 weeks . .
II
.Delivery guaranteed within 6 weeks.

The heaters were in fact delivered late.

"

In this connection,

Mr. Farber, during the course of his cross-examination by Brown's
attorney responded (T. 72-73):
"
.The first problem was on Job 281 where the heaters
were late, in the first place, and when they were finally
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delivered, in our opinion, the heaters, didn't perform in
accordance with specification requirements.
The other two problems were on Job No. 277 and Job No.
285 where orders were accepted by Brown with the condition that time was of the essence and this was verbally
communicated to Borwn, that they had to be delivered on
time.
And in some purchase orders the time was guaranteed and
we did not get even delivery of the heaters, and at one
point in time there was around $400,000 worth of work,
of Mallory work being held up that we couldn't complete.
That, at our normal yearly volume of doing business,
represented about ninety percent of our work in process
at this particular time. So it was an urgent critical
thing with Mallory Engineering to get our heater problems
solved . . . "
Even before any heaters were delivered Mr. Farber was
gravely concerned because the shop drawings were not furnished
Mallory within the required two weeks.

On cross-examination by

Brown's attorney, Mr. Farber not only expressed his deep concern
about this but he also said what he did about it as follows

(T. 117):
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

. . . Now, when did you first become concerned with
regard to whether or not the manufactured product
prepared by Valad was going to meet your requirements?
I first became concerned with the overall project when
Mallory Engineering did not receive the shop drawings
within two weeks, within the guaranteed time.
And did you ask for an explanation of this?
Not only did I ask for an explanation, I constantly
hounded Carl Nyman to produce those documents so
we could make the elevation - or so we could determine
how we were going to mount these heaters in our
equipment that was currently being fabricated.

There is no testimony or evidence in the record which
challenges the fact that as between Mallory and Brown, time
was of the essence.

The testimony of Brown's employee, Carl

Nyman, dramatically and affirmatively demonstrates this.
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Brown was buying heaters from Valad to re-sell to Mallory,
and, in order to meet its contract commitment to Mallory,
Br0Wil had to see that Valad shipped the heaters timely.

Valad

did not ship the heaters timely and so, of course, Brown was
concerned.

The testimony of Brown's employee, Carl Nyman,

demonstrating his concern about the heaters being delivered
late is (T. 343-5):

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

(By Mr. Tibbals) A great deal of discussion has been
had, Mr. Nyman, during the course of this trial, as
to deficiencies on the delivery schedule of Valad.
Did you have any understanding at any time, verbally
or in writing, with Valad as to when these machines
or these heaters were to be delivered?
Yes, we did.
How was that manifested? Was it a verbal conversation
or was it in writing?
It was initially a verbal conversation. I would have
to examine the exhibits to see if it appears on the
written quotations, but I believe it does.
I now hand you exhibit first, No. 46, and ask you
to examine that and be sure that that relates to the
heaters that we are discussing in this case?
Yes, it does.
Does it contain any information with regard to delivery
schedule?
The delivery schedule quoted was between six and eight
weeks.
And what was the date of that instrument?
This particular quotation is dated December 6 of 1972.
Now, what does that mean in the industry, six or eight
weeks from what?
From the time of receipt of an order until the time
shipment or delivery is made.
So that since that document that you have in your hand
relates to the 15 kilowatt heaters, it would appear
that the time should then be computed from the date of
receipt of Exhibit 10 and 11?

-2J-
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A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Yes. That is correct. Uh-huh.
So that since those instruments are dated December 15
and December 20 respectively, 10, 15 and 11, the 20th,
the six to eight weeks should start from the receipt
of this order by Valad; isn't that true?
This is correct.
Were they shipped within that time?
They were not.
Was this deficiency called to the attention of Valad?
It was, in several communications. Telephone communications were conducted with Valad to try to expedite the
shipment and to obtain the heaters when they were
required.
Did Valad ever communicate directly, to your knowledge,
with Mallory concerning the delay in shipment?
Yes, he did. On a particular instance he provided them
with a letter of explanation of the delays.

Valad simply cannot claim now that time was not of the essence.
Valad promised delivery of the 15 KW and the 21 KW heaters within
6 to 8 weeks.

Peter Cecchini of Valad admits this.

In testifying

as to the promised delivery of the 15 KW heater he refers to
a telephone conversation he had with Mr. Nyman of Brown on 12-5-72
and says (T. 373 line 9):

"

.I gave him delivery of six to eight weeks . .

II

As to the promised delivery of the 21 KW heater Mr. Cecchini told
Mr. Nyman (T. 374 line 22):

"

.And I gave delivery of six to eight weeks . .

II

The testimony of Valad's employee, Peter Cecchini, and the
notes he made of a telephone conversation he had on 3-26-73 with
Carl Nyman of Brown show that the 36 KW and the 50 KW heaters
were to be shipped April 5th. (T. 475 lines 13-23)

Mr. Cecchini

admitted Valad had approved shop drawings for the 12 KW, the 15
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KW and the 36 KW heaters.

(T. 476, lines 14-17)

He admitted

further that even though Valad didn't have approved shop drawings
for the SO KW heater, he nevertheless, represented to Mr. Nyman
of Brown that the SO KW heater would be shipped April Sth.

Mr.

Cecchini also admitted that after Mallory got into the act
because of the defective heaters which were delivered, Mr. Farber

1

of Mallory inquired many times as to when the heaters would be
delivered.
Those heaters which were delivered were delivered late.
is not disputed by anyone.
were never delivered.
the essence.

This I

The 36 KW and the SO KW heaters

There is no question but that time was of

Valad's apparent assertion now that time was not

of the essence simply does not square with the undisputed facts
and is without merit.
Point IV
THE DAMAGES THE COURT AWARDED MALLORY MERELY
COMPENSATED MALLORY FOR ONLY THOSE DAMAGES
MALLORY ACTUALLY SUSTAINED AND THOSE WHICH WERE
WITHIN THE REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE PARTIES
The general rule applicable to recoverable damages is set
forth in 22 Am Jur 2d - Damages - Sec. 12, page 28 as follows:
"Com ensation is the stated oal of Courts in awardin
or tortious injury or or reach o a contractual
promise . . . With contracts, compensation is most often
stated in terms of placing the Plaintiff in the same
financial position in which he would have been had the
promise not been broken." (Emphasis supplied)
The same general rule is expressed just a little differently in
2S CJS - Damages - Sec. 71, page 836, providing in part:
" . . . the measure of damages is such sum as will compensate
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the person injured for the loss sustained, with the least
hardship to the wrongdoer consistent with the idea of fair
compensation, and with the duty of the person injured to
exercise reasonable care to mitigate the injury, according
to the opportunities which may fairly be or appear to be
within his reach; and the same rule obtains whether the
loss is claimed for in"ur to
ersonal in'ur , or
breach o contract.
Emp
While both Brown and Valad in their respective briefs cite
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code as precluding at least some of
the damages which the Court awarded, neither of them cited all
of the pertinent provisions of that Code which specifically
allow and justify all the damages which the Court awarded
Mallory.

The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code

which are applicable are Secs. 70A-2-711, 712, 713, 714 and 715,
UCA 1953 as amended.
70A-2-711 provides in part:
"(l)Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates
or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes
acceptance then with respect to any goods involved . .
. the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done
so may in addition to recovering so much of the price
as has been paid
(a)"cover" and have damages . . .
(b)recover damages for nondelivery . . . (Emphasis supplied)
70A-2-712 provides in part:
"(l)After a breach within the preceding section the buyer
may "cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the
seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the
difference between the cost of cover and the contract
rice to ether with an incidental or conse uential
damages as hereina ter defined. . . Emphasis supplied)
70A-l-713 provides in part:
"(l)Subject to the provisions of this chapter . . . the
measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiatIOD by the
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seller is the difference between the market price at
the time when the bu er learned of the breach and the
contract rice to ether with an incidenta an
consequentia
. Emp asis supp ie
70A-2-714 provides in part:
given notification
of

(2) The measure of damages for breach of warrant is the

difference at the time and place of acceptance between
the value of the good accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circuo.stances show roximate dama es of a different
amount.
Emp asis supp ie
(3)

70A-2-715 provides in part:
"(l)Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach
include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection,
receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected, any connnercially reasonable
charges, expenses or connnissions in connection with
effecting cover and an other reasonable ex ense incident
to the delay or ot er reach.
Emp asis supp ie
(2) Conse*uential damages resulting from the seller's
breac include

or
There is no question but that Mallory sustained substantial
damages, and, that it did everything reasonably possible to mitigat<
its damages by expeditiously securing heaters from another source
which met the required performance criteria to replace the
defective heaters which were fabricated by Valad and sold to
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Mallory by Brown.

In this connection Brown states in its

brief at page 29:
"It was conceded at the trial that the cost of securing
replacement heaters and the incidental costs to reconstruct
the test chambers to fit the new heaters, the cost of
removal of the defective heaters and the installation of
the new heaters were direct costs and under the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code were allowable items of damage to be awarded
to Mallory against Valad and if the Court refused to accept
Brown's theory of the case, against Brown. . . "
Not only were the "direct costs" allowable items of damage
but so were the "indirect costs".
conjectural.

They were not speculative or

They comprised only a fair and just pro-rata

allocation of the overhead expenses to the very Jobs affected
by the defective heaters on a "completed-contract method" of
accounting basis.

Mallory's accounting was not done by Mallory's

employees but by Elwood and Barnes, a Certified Public Accounting
Firm in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The "completed-contract method"

of accounting for income and expenses was the method used by
Mallory from its inception and is authorized and approved by the
Internal Revenue Service,

See Sec. 451 of the 1954 Internal

Revenue Code and the Regulations promulgated thereunder, Sec. 1.451-3
(2) .

A fair and reasonable allocation of "overhead expenses'' is
a proper element of recoverable damages.

In an annotation in

3 ALR 3rd dealing with the subject of DAMAGES - OVERHEAD EXPENSES,
it is stated in the Summary and comment in Sec. 2 at page 692
that:
"If the defendant has been responsible for the plaintiff's
incurring or wasting reasonably forseeable overhead expenses,
it is generally agreed that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages as reimbursement for his outlay of such
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overhead e'i¥enses. (See Secs. 7-10, infra.) If, however,
the plainti f's claim for damages is based on the theory
that the defendant has prevented the plaintiff from carrying out certain transactions and has thereby been responsible
for causing theplaintiff a loss of profits, there can be a
divergence of opinion as to whether or not ~he plaintiff
must deduct the overhead expenses allocable to the
unperformed transactions in computing the amount of lost
profits recoverable from the defendant; and to the extent
that the plaintiff is not required to deduct such overhead
expenses in computing the amount of his damages recoverable
for lost profits, these overhead ex enses are of necessit
included as an element o
amages.
- , in ra.
Mallory did not and does not seek lost profits as part of its
damages but only those damages actually sustained which normally
and particularly in this case include a portion of Mallory's
overhead expenses.
The same annotation on damages and overhead expenses in 3

ALR 3rd states at page 695:
"If the plaintiff has wasted or otherwise incurred
overhead expenses as a result of the defendant's wrongful
conduct (such as a tort or breach of contract), and the
plaintiff is seeking to obtain reimbursement for such
outlay, it is enerall a reed that the overhead ex enses,
to the extent
ocated,
are recovera

*

*

*

" . . . it would appear that the defendant often knows or
has reason to know that overhead expenses will be
allocable to transactions which he wrongfully prevents
or delays the plaintiff from carrying out, and this
principle has received recognition both in modern
decisions and in modern statutes,"
The above annotation cites numerous cases where overhead
expenses were allowable by the Courts as an element of recoverable
damages.
This Court in the case of Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22
Utah 2d 49, 448 P2d 709, said:
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'_'Speaking generally about damages, the desired objective
is to.evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct,
practical and accurate method that can be employed."
In the case of Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company vs.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P2d
906, the District Court had included attorneys fees in its
award of damages in an action on a construction contractor's
performance bond.

The award of attorney's fees was challenged

because such fees were not provided for
express provisions of the bond.

by statute or by the

Nevertheless, this Court said

at page 907:
"The rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach
of contract is based upon the concept of reasonable
forseeability that loss of such general character would
result from the breach. Therefore, to be compensable,
the loss must result from the breach in the natural and
usual course of events, so that it can fairly and reasonably be said that if the ~inds of the parties had
averted to breach when the contract was made, loss of
such character would have been within their contemplation.
Applying the above rule to this case: it could reasonably
be foreseen that the natural and usual consequence of
Cassady's failure to pay the laborers and materialmen would
bring about the series of events which occurred: that liens
would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to enforce
them; that plaintiff Title Company, having the duty to keep
the titles clear, would interpose defenses and attend to
some disposition of the claims, which would require the
services of attorneys and court costs incidental thereto.
That is the type of loss for which Hartford's bond was given
to guard against."
The specific details of all the damages which follow in
fact need not necessarily be within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of the contract to be recoverable.

As

pointed out in 22 Am Jur 2d - Damages - Sec. 58:

-34-
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"The principle that damages, to be recoverable, must have
been in the contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was entered into, does not require the defaulting
party to know the specific details of the injury or of
the damages which followed in fact. For example, it is
sufficient if the defaulting party could, at the time the
contract was entered into, foresee that failure to make
delivery would cause the nondefaulting party's factory
to shut down. . . "
See also Kelley, M. & Co. v. La Crosse Carriage Co., 120 Wis.
84, 97 NW 674.
In a rather detailed discussion and analysis of the various
remedies of the buyer under the Uniform Commercial Code set forth
in 67 Am Jur 2d - Sales - Secs, 664-667, Sec. 667 at page 864
provides in part:
" . . . The term 'consequential damages' is not itself
precisely defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, but it
would seem to cover damages other than those standarized
in various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which
might flow proximately from the breach by the seller, and
might be equivalent to what are sometimes called 'special
damages'."
The attention of this Court is respectfully invited to the
annotation in 3 ALR 3rd which in Sec. 10 at pages 710-711 reviews
several cases holding that overhead expenses are recoverable
as an element of damages.

Also, several additional cases to

the same effect are cited in the supplement to that annotation.
Carl Nyman, Brown's employee, was well aware of the fact
that Mallory was building environmental units for the government.
He had previously been instrumental on behalf of Brown in selling
Mallory many thousands of dollars of equipment and instrumentation
devices.

He obviously wanted to sell more items to Mallory.

The electrical heaters which Mallory required for the environmental
units fell naturally within his sales line because he himself
was Sponsored
an electrical
engineer and he knew Mallory's needs.
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The environmental units Mallory was manufacturing for the
government were very large and occupied most of Mallory's shop
space. (T. 685 lines 25-6) At one point in time, approximately
$400,000.00 worth of work or about 90% of Mallory's work was
being held up (T. 73 lines 3 to 6) because of the heaters Brown
had contracted to sell Mallory and have delivered to Mallory
within definite time schedules.
was of the essence.

Brown knew absolutely that time

Brown has never denied this and has

admitted that the heaters were not timely delivered.

Because of

the defective heaters Mallory could do nothing more with the
bulk of the work in its shop and Mallory's overhead expenses
were going on every day.

(T.80) Mallory did the only reasonable

thing it could do to mitigage and minimize its damages by
securing heaters meeting required performance criteria from
another source.

Mallory did this however only after both Valad

and Brown refused and failed to do anything about the defective
heaters.
Brown, under all of the foregoing circumstances, either knew
or reasonably should have known that the natural, reasonable and
readily forseeable consequences of Brown's failure to deliver
Mallory heaters meeting required performance criteria as Brown
had contracted to do, would be the very da:r;i.ages which Mallory
actually sustained.

In this connection it is undisputed that

Brown also tried to prevail upon Valad to do something about
the situation so as to mitigate the damages which Brown knew and
recognized were accruing.
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Point V

BROWN'S CLAil1 TO BEING MERELY AN "INTERMEDIARY" IS
UNFOUNDED, AND, THE CASES BROWN CITES TO CAST ALL
BLAME ON VALAD AND EXONERATE BROWN FROM LIABILITY
DO NOT SUPPORT BROWN IN THIS REGARD BUT ESTABLISH
THAT MALLORY CAN RECOVER AGAINST BROWN AND VALAD
Brown, in endeavoring to exonerate itself from liability,
states in Point Ill of its brief at page 26 that" . . . Brown
should not be involved in the controversy which basically
involves only Mallory and Valad . . . "purportedly because,
as Brown states further, " . . . the parties throughout have
treated Brown as a mediator or intermediary . . . "

These state-

ments are simply not true.
Brown was not Mallory's agent or intermediary.

Mallory

contracted to purchase heaters from Brown and Brown contracted
to sell heaters to Mallory.

Brown defaulted on that contract.

During the course of the proceedings the unchallenged and
unchallengeable statement made by Mr. Schmidt, Valad's attorney
was (T. 615 lines 23-28):
" . . . there is nothing in the record to dispute the
fact that the only relationship between Mallory and
Brown was that of purchaser and seller. And there is
nothing in the record to dispute the fact that as between
Brown and Valad the relationship was purely one of
purchaser and seller."
Brown's own employee, Carl Nyman, admitted that he never
represented to Valad that he was an "agent" or "representative"
of Mallory or that he was an "intermediary" or "conduit" for
Mallory. (T. 351 lines 15-21)

There were discussions which did

take place between Brown and Valad about Brown becoming a
representative of Valad but these never materialized. (T. 327-8)
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On being questioned by Brown's attorney as to why Valad
sent certain shop drawings to Mallory, Mr. Cecchini of Valad
replied (T. 442 lines 9-13):
A.

Q.
A.

. . . The order is with T. R. Brown & Associates. And
I was told by T. R. Brown & Associates, who is my
customer, to send it to Mallory Engineering.
So you did what you were told?
That is correct.

In further discussing the relationship between Brown and Valad,
Mr. Cecchini of Valad said (T. 482 lines 7 through 17):

Q.
Q.

Who was your customer?
T. R. Brown.
Your customer was never Mallory, was it?

A.

No.

Q.

But the order was that you send the heater to Mallory.
That was really the only relationship?
That was who it was shipped to.
And to whom were you to bill?
T. R. Brown.
Because they were your customer?
That is correct.

A.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

That Brown was not a mere "intermediary" but the actual
seller and that Mallory was the buyer of the heaters was
recognized and acknowledged by the Trial Court which was in the
advantaged position of seeing and hearing the witnesses,
observing their demeanor, judgine their biases and prejudices,
and personally examining the exhibits adduced at the trial.

In

this connection the Trial Court remarked (T. 294 lines 24-27):
"THE COURT: Well, I know what the relationship between
the plaintiff (Mallory) and Brown is. That's evident
from the exhibits, and that's vendor-vendee, at least in
the initial staees . . . "(Emphasis supplied)

-38-
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In striving to exonerate itself from liability and cast all
responsibility on Valad, Brown cites two Washington cases.

One

case is that of Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 153, 289 P2d
1015.

Brown acknowledges that the factual situation in the

Freeman v. Navarre case is different from the case here on appeal.
Nevertheless, Brown states in its brief at page 28 that the
Freeman v. Navarre case supports Brown's theory of non-liability
as far as Brown is concerned because it " . . . recognized that
one servine as a conduit is not liable for the mal-performance
or non-performance of a third party contractor."

The actual

holding of the case is only that even without "privity of contract"
an ultimate user of a product may sue the manufacturer.
In the first place, in this case on appeal, Brown was not
a mere "conduit" or "intermediary".

Brown was the seller and

Mallory was the buyer of the heaters manufactured by Valad.
The Freeman v. Navarre case concerned itself primarily with the
legal concept of "privity of contract".

It had to decide the

issue as to whether the user of an article with no privity of
contract with the manufacturer could sue and recover from the
manufacturer because of a defect in the manufactured article.
The exact language of the Court during the course of its
decision in part was"
" . . . It follows that the only question presented here
is whether appellant, the ultimate user can recover from
respondent, the manufacturer."
The court held the user could recover from the manufacturer.
case does not support Brown's theory that the seller (Brown in

-39-
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The

this case) is relieved of responsibility.

On the contrary,

it supports Mallory's claim that Mallory (the buyer of the
heaters from Brown) cannot only recover from the defaulting
seller (Brown) but also from the manufacturer (Valad) even
though there may not have been any privity of contract between
Mallory and Valad.
The other Washington case Brown cites in its attempt to
relieve Brown of any liability and place the entire blame on
Valad is the case of Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co.,
Inc., 422 P2d 496.

Brown even states in its brief at page 27

that the Washington Court in the Kadiak case "
with an almost factually parallel situation.
here on appeal.

.was confronted
" as the case

The Kadiak case is factually distinguishable

and legally non-supportive of Brown's attempt to relieve Brown
of responsibility and liability.
In the interest of clarity and brevity, the parties in the
Kadiak v. Murphy case hereafter will simply be referred to as
follows:

The plaintiff, Kadiak Fisheries Co., the owner of a

fishing vessel which needed a new motor, will be referred to as
Kadiak.

One of the defendants in that case, Alaska Pacific

Supply Company, the actual "Sales Agent'' for the motor manufacturer
Murphy Diesel Co., will be referred to as Alaska Pacific.

And,

the motor manufacturer and other defendant, Murphy Diesel Co., will
be referred to as Murphy.
The Kadiak V. Murphy case was an action by Kadiak, the
vessel owner, against the motor manufacturer's "Sales Agent",
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Alaska Pacific, and the motor manufacturer, Murphy, based on
negligence and breach of implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability.

In the case on appeal here, Mallory did not

and does not base its case on the theory of negligence.

Mallory's

case was and is a "breach of contract" action against Brown for
Brown having furnished Mallory defective heaters which Brown
sold Mallory, and for Brown not furnishing Mallory other heaters
which Brown sold Mallory, as well as an action by Mallory aga:inst
Valad on a "third-party beneficiary" theory and because the
heaters Valad manufactured did not meet the written certifications
Valad furnished Mallory.
It is of particular significance to note that in the Kadiak
v. Murphy case, Alaska Pacific was actually the "Sales Agent"
of Murphy, the motor manufacturer, while in this case, Brown was
not the "Sales Agent" of Valad nor an agent for Mallory.

In fact,

in this case, no "Sales Agent" was involved because Brown was
the seller and Mallory was the buyer of the heaters as between
Brown and Mallory, and as between Valad and Brown, Valad was the
seller and Brown was the buyer.
In the Kadiak v. Murphy case, both the manufacturer, Murphy,
and the "Sales Agent", Alaska Pacific, denied negligence and any
breach of implied warranty.

No writing was involved in that case

such as is involved in this case by virtue of the written
certifications from the heater manufacturer, Valad, to Mallory,
the ultimate consumer.

In the Kadiak v. Murphy case, the

-41-
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-manufacturer, Murphy, alleged lack of privity of contract between
it and the vessel owner, Kadiak.

Also, the "Sales Agent",

Alaska Pacific, (which "Sales Agent" is lacking in this case),
asserted a cross-claim against the motor manufacturer, Murphy,
its principal.
At the conclusion of Kadiak's evidence, Alaska Pacific was
allowed to amend, over Kadiak's objections, to assert the
defense of estoppel against Kadiak.

At the end of all the evidence,

Kadiak's claims of breach of warranty against Alaska Pacific, and
Alaska Pacific's defense of estoppel against Kadiak and its
cross-claim against Murphy were withdrawn from the jury.

The

issues of negligence, breach of implied warranties, privity of
contract, contributory negligence and damages remained and were
submitted to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict against

Murphy and exonerated Alaska Pacific.

Murphy appealed.

After

the appeal, Kadiak, Murphy and Alaska Pacific stipulated that
Alaska Pacific, the "Sales Agent", was not a party respondent
so that the appeal was limited to the controversy between the
vessel owner, Kadiak, and the motor manufacturer, Murphy, and
that in the event of a new trial, the "Sales Agent", Alaska
Pacific, would not be a party defendant.

Accordingly, the parties

stipulated that the jury verdict and judgment of dismissal as
to the "Sales Agent", Alaska Pacific, was final.

In the course

of its decision the Supreme Court of Washington among other
things, said:
". . . under the issues as ultimately framed and
submitted to the jury, the theories of responsibility
-42-
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and liability as between Murphy Diesel, the
manufacturer, and Alaska Pacific, the sales conduit
(THE MANUFACTURER'S "SALES AGENT"), were not equal Murphy Diesel could be found liable upon either one
of two theories (breach of warranty or negligence) ,
whereas Alaska Pacific's (THE MANUFACTURER'S "SALES
AGENT'S"
ia i it was restricte to t e t eor
neg igence in connection wit t e sa e an insta
tion of the motor." (Emphasis and designations of
"Sales Agent" supplied.)
Thus, the Kadiak v. Murphy case and this case are readily
distinguishable.

In the Kadiak v. Murphy case, negligence was

the only possible theory of liability against the acknowledged
manufacturer's "Sales Agent".

In this case no "Sales Agent"

was involved and at least insofar as Mallory's claims against
either Brown or Valad are involved, the theory of negligence
is not applicable.

The theory of liability against Brown is

breach of contract which Brown in fact breached by delivering
or causing to be delivered defective heaters to Mallory and
by failing to deliver to Mallory other heaters which Brown
contracted to deliver.
The Washington Court's reasoning in the Kadiak v. Murphy
case as to the motor manufacturer's liability (Murphy) in that
case, and the heater manufacturer's liability(Valad) in this
case, is perfectly sound and justifies this Court in affirming
the judgments awarded Mallory against both Brown and Valad.
While in this case Mallory did not ask for and was not awarded
"loss of profits" but only "actual damages", the Washington
Court did, in fact, award damages for "lost profits" as a
result of the lost time the fishing vessel encountered because
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of the defective motor.

During the course of its decision the

Court said in 422 P2d at page 505:
"In the instant case there can be little doubt under
the evidence that Murphy Diesel was aware of the
fishing function and purpose of the Jaguar in Kadiak's
fleet. It was advised that the vessel was being
repowered to continue its operations. There could,
therefore, be virtuall no uestion as to the fact that
oss o
is in time ue to motor i icu ties wou
resu t in a iminution o
ro its. Li ewise t e
evidence leaves itt e room or arfument t at t e
Ja uar did lose time as a result o motor troubles.
The on y e ement remaining, t en, or ispute is t e
certainty of the amount of the lost profits occasioned
by the Jaguar's incapacitation due to engine repairs.
On this factor, however, Kadiak produced uncontradicted
evidence revealing the average daily crab deliveries of
other comparable vessels fishing in the same area in
which the Jaguar was fishing on the occasions
irmnediately prior to engine breakdowns. It also produced
undisputed evidence bearing upon the average prices paid
for the pertinent catches and the usual cost of operation.
Under these circumstances, the jury was not required to
speculate. It had only to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, for it was presented with a reasonable basis
upon which ito determine the amount of the loss.
"
(Emphasis supplied)
Neither the undisputed facts nor the cited case law support
Brown's theory that it was a mere "intermediary" and, therefore,
absolved from all liability.
Point VI
THE JUDGMENTS AGAINST BROWN AND VALAD ARE
SUBSTANTIATED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT AND
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
Brown contracted to sell Mallory heaters which would meet
specified performance criteria.

The heaters were to be delivered

timely because time was of the essence which fact Brown knew
and admits.

However, none of the heaters were timely delivered.

Furthermore, every heater which was delivered, including the
12 KW heaters, were defective.

Not one heater met the required
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performance criteria although the 12 KW heaters were
subsequently replaced with good heaters.
that all heaters delivered were defective.

Brown conceded
Some of the

heaters which Brown contracted to sell Mallory were never
delivered and Brown never offered to do anything to replace the
defective heaters nor to supply the heaters which were not
delivered.

Brown knew that the heaters it contracted to sell

Mallory were for the environmental units Mallory was building
for the government.

Those environmental units were very large

and in fact occupied most of Mallory's shop space and at one
point in time constituted approximately 90% of Mallory's work
in process.
Valad, on the other hand, partly performed the contract
it had with Brown by manufacturing some of the heaters which
Valad shipped directly to Mallory pursuant to Brown's instructions.

And, Valad billed Brown, not Mallory, for those heaters.

As indicated above, all of the heaters Valad manufactured
and shipped Mallory were defective.

Valad did, however, replace

the defective 12 KW heaters with good heaters.

Although Valad

never shipped some of the heaters, Valad expressly represented
to both Brown and Mallory that the balance of the heaters would
be shipped, and Valad also expressly represented to both Brown
and Mallory the exact delivery dates for those heaters.
Furthermore, Valad certified in writing to Mallory that the 15
KW heaters and the 21 KW heaters Valad manufactured and shipped
Mallory would, in fact, meet the required performance criteria.
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However, the undisputed and undisputable evidence is that
they did not.
There is no question but that Mallory sustained
substantial damages because of the defective heaters and that
those damages were only the natural forseeable consequences
of the heaters contracted for not being timely delivered as
they should have been.

The damages which Mallory sustained

and for which judgments were awarded Mallory by the Court
are substantiated by substantial competent and admissible
evidence and the judgments should accordingly be affirmed.
This Court has expressed itself many times on the
standard rule of review in cases similar to the case presently
being reviewed here by this Court.

In the case of Fillmore

City v. Reeve, 571 P2d 1316, Justice Crockett speaking for
a unanimous Court said:
" . . . we follow the standard rule of review, that
where the evidence is in conflict, we assume that
the trial court believed those aspects of the
evidence that support his findings. . . "
Justice Hall, speaking for a unanimous Court in the case of
Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P2d 393, said:
"This Court has consistently followed the wellrecognized standard of appellate review which
precludes the substitution of our judgment for
that of the trial court on issues of fact, and where
its findings and judgments are based on substantial,
competent, admissible evidence we will not disturb
them."
In the case of Wash-a-Matic, Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P2d 632, Justice

Ellett had this to say:
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"The evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment
made, and we should sustain the trial court even if
we might have come to a different decision had we
been trying the matter. . "
Finally, in the case of Dalton v. Dalton, 6 Utah 2d 132, 307
P2d 894, Justice Henriod said:
" . . . on review of a case of this kind we must view
the facts in a light most favorable to defendants and
we cannot disturb the conclusions of the trial court
if, viewing the facts in such fashion, there is
substantial competent evidence supporting the trial
court's pronouncement."
See also Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P2d 176,
and Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P2d 182.
The judgments awarded Mallory are supported by substantial
competent admissible evidence and should be affirmed.
'CONCLUSION
The Judgments awarded Mallory against Brown and Valad
are supported by substantial, competent, admissible evidence
and in accordance with the law applicable in such cases.

Those

Judements should accordingly be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
WILLIAM J. CAYIAS
and
QUENTIN--Y:-:- R. ALSTON
Attorneys for Mallory Engineering, Inc
1558 South 1100 East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
467-5100 or 467-5109
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